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SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 
Respondent raises two new matters in her opposing brief: 
first, she requests that the trial court' s decision awarding her 
alimony for a period of five years be modified and made 
permanent; second, she requests attorney fees on appeal. 
Respondent is not entitled to an award of permanent 
alimony because: (1) she d i cl not file a t:i mely and pi: oper cross 
appeal; and, (2) she is able to support herself at a standard of 
living to which she was accustomed during the marriage, and 
appellant is unable to pay alimony. 
Respondent is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on 
appeal because: (1) appellant's claim of error by the trial court 
is based i ipon a reasonable legal and factual foundation; and, (2) 
respondent has sufficient financial means with which to pay her 
attorney fees in connection with this appeal. 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 
I. RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF PERMANENT ALIMONY. 
Respondent raises the issue in Point IV. of her brief that 
the trial court erred in limiting the duration of alimony awarded 
to her. (Respondent's brief at 9, 24-27). She requests that the 
court of appeals affirm the trial court decision; or in the 
alternative, modify the alimony award to provide that that award 
be made permanent. (I£. at 2, 27). An award of permanent 
alimony is not appropriate in this case on both procedural and 
substantive grounds. 
A. PROCEDURAL GROUNDS. 
This court must decline on procedural grounds to address 
respondent7 s request that the alimony award be modified because 
respondent has not filed a cross appeal on this issue. Kinsman 
v. Kinsman, 748 P. 2d 210, 211 (Utah App. 1988); Wiese v. Wiese, 
699 P. 2d 700, 703 (Utah 1985). 
B. SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS. 
This court must decline to extend the trial court' s award 
of alimony on substantive grounds for the reason that the facts 
in this case do not meet the criteria established by this court 
in awarding permanent alimony. In Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P. 2d 
942, 951 (Utah App. 1988), this court stated that alimony is 
properly terminated where the court determines that the recipient 
is able to support herself at a standard of living to which she 
was accustomed during the marriage, or the obligor is unable to 
pay. See als^ Bridenbauah v. Bridenbauah. P. 2d , 125 Utah 
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Adv Rep 52, 5 3 (UtahApp. 1990); Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072, 
1075 (Utah 1985). 
In this case, respondent is capable of self-support at a 
level consistent with the standard of living she enjoyed during 
the marriage. (A detailed discussion of this issue is found at 
13, 18-19 and 29 of appellant's brief). Appellant,, on the other 
hand, is unable to pay alimony of any duration as a result of 
the trial court' s abuse of discretion in awarding respondent over 
one-half of a p p e J ] a n 1:" s n e t e a r n :i n g s , a J ] o £ r e s p o n d e n t' s 
premarital assets which included income-producing property, the 
overwhelming majority of the marital assets, the property given 
appellant by his father and over one-half of the attorney fees 
requested by the respondent at the time of trial. (A detailed 
discussion of this issue is found at 16-18, 22-24 and 27-28). 
The trial court' s allocation of the parties' financial and 
material resources is particularly inequitable in this case in 
that appellant is without sufficient sums with which to support 
himself, and wi11 be required to expend substantial money in 
establishing his own separate household. (See discussion at 16-
21 of appellant's brief). 
The trial court' s error in this case was not in failing to 
award permanent alimony to the respondent, but rather, in 
awarding alimony at all. 
II. RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Respondent requests in Point VIII. of her brief that this 
court award her attorney' s fees on appeal. (Respondent' s brief 
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at 2, 10, 39-40). She bases her claim on the argument that 
appellant' s claims on appeal are without merit and on the 
argument that she is without sufficient financial means with 
which to pay her fees in connection with this appeal. (Iji. at 
10). 
A. FRIVOLOUS APPEAL CLAIM. 
In response to her first claim, this court has stated that 
an appeal having no reasonable legal or factual basis is 
frivolous and may result in the imposition of costs and attorney 
fees against the appellant. Riche v. Riche. P. 2d , 123 
Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 33 (Utah App. 1989). Sanctions are permitted 
under Rule 3 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, but 
caution is applied so as to impose such sanctions only in 
"egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right 
to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. " Porco v. Porco, 752 
P. 2d 369, 369 (Utah App. 1988). Accordingly, sanctions are 
imposed only when: 
[A]n appeal is obviously without any merit 
and has been taken with no reasonable 
likelihood of prevailing, and results in 
delayed implementation of the judgment of the 
lower court; increased costs in litigation; 
and dissipation of the time and resources of 
the Law Court. 
Id. (Citations omitted). 
The thrust of respondent' s arguments against the appellant 
in support of her claim for attorney fees under rule 33 are that: 
(1) the respondent successfully proved at trial that the 
appellant testified falsely (Respondent's brief at 8, 14-17); 
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(2) the trial court may elect not to impose interest on the 
judgment (Respondent's brief at 10, 31-32); (3) the evidence and 
application of the law supports only an interpretation that 
gifts made by appellant' s father were intended for the benefit of 
both parties and should be awarded to respondent (Respondent' s 
brief at 9-10, 27-31); and, (4) the evidence presented met all 
elements necessary to sustain an award of attorney fees by the 
trial court (Respondent's brief at 10, 32- 39). 
Regrettably, respondent also includes as part of her 
argument numerous ad hominem remarks (Respondent' s brief at 2-3, 
13, 41), as well as matters not admitted into evidence before the 
trial court, which must not be considered on appeal to this court 
(Respondent's brief at 21-23; Vol. I. Transcript of proceedings 
at ii.; Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P. 2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App. 1987)). 
Responding to each argument made by the respondent, 
appellant first addresses the issue of credibility. The findings 
of fact, which were drafted by the respondent, are instructive on 
this issue. Paragraph six of the findings concludes, in part, 
that either appellant was underpaid or overpaid by his employer. 
Paragraph seven of the findings concludes, in part, that 
conflicting testimony was presented about the accuracy of the 
parties' tax returns (which respondent admitted she prepared 
(Vol. I. Transcript of proceedings at 302)). Paragraph fifteen 
concludes, in part, that the court believed that appellant was 
paid not more than $ 2, 000. 00 during the time that appellant' s 
father gifted certain sums of money. Finally, paragraph eighteen 
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refers the reader to the judge's ruling from the bench, who, from 
page 347 through 349, points the finger of disbelief at both 
parties. 
The second argument raised by respondent concerning the 
trial court' s discretion to modify or abate interest on the 
judgment may be disposed summarily on the basis of this court' s 
decision in Marchant v. Marchant. 743 P. 2d 199, 206-07 (Utah App. 
1987). Inasmuch as this issue alone justifies an appeal from 
the decision of the trial court, respondent is not entitled to 
attorney fees under rule 3 3. 
The third argument raised by respondent concerns the 
trial court' s assessment of the evidence and its application of 
law -to the distribution of marital assets acquired by gifted 
money from appellant' s father. Assuming for argument purposes 
that respondent' s position is correct; that is, that the trial 
court properly concluded that the money gifted by appellant' s 
father was given to both parties and that the Mortensen decision 
does not apply to this case, this court on appeal must still 
address the issues raised by appellant in Point I. of his brief, 
that is, that the trial court inequitably divided the income and 
property of the parties, leaving appellant without sufficient 
means to support himself. (See appellant's brief at 10-21). 
The trial court' s division of marital assets, debts and 
income leaves respondent with $ 1,680.00 per month income 
compared to appellant's $ 442.00. (IJ3* at 17). In addition, 
respondent was awarded the marital home; the rental home; all of 
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the household furniture, fixtures and appliances; the family 
vehicle; and, approximately $ 4,000.00 in attorney fees. (Id. : 
Respondent's brief at 7). Appellant received one-half of the 
equity in the marital home without interest, a boat, a vehicle 
owned by his employer and certain items of personal property. 
(Respondent's brief at 7; Findings of Fact, paragraph 14). On 
the face of the findings, this court can determine that the 
distribution was inequitable. 
The offsetting factor for the trial court' s lopsided award 
is presumably the trial court' s belief that appellant had more 
income than reflected in the parties' tax returns, (Vol. II. 
Transcript of proceedings at 349; Respondent's brief at 21-24), 
even though the trial court was unable to determine what amount 
that might be. (L&, 349-50). The problem with this analysis is 
that whether appellant earned a nominal or substantial amount 
more than the evidence depicted is not known. There is no 
baseline from which this court may determine the fairness of the 
trial court' s division now, or in the future should either party 
come before this court on a modification of the decree. 
The fourth argument raised by the respondent concerns the 
sufficiency of the evidence to determine the reasonableness and 
need for attorney fees requested by the respondent at the time of 
trial. The element of reasonableness is addressed in detail in 
pages 24-27 of appellant' s brief and will not be repeated here. 
There is, however, an aspect of the need for attorney fees which 
has not been addressed in respondent' s brief. The evidence and 
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argument discussed at pages 36-37 of respondent' s brief does not 
address the fact that respondent has been awarded a 
disproportionate share of the parties' income and property and is 
in better financial position than the appellant to pay her costs 
and attorney fees incurred at trial. 
Appellant has asserted reasonable legal and factual 
arguments in support of his claim that the trial court erred. If 
there are numerous arguments in his claim, it is for the reason 
and fact that the trial court made numerous errors. Appellant' s 
claim has merit and therefore respondent is not entitled to an 
award of attorney fees under rule 3 3. 
B. INSUFFICIENT MEANS CLAIM. 
The final argument made by respondent in support of her 
claim for attorney fees on appeal is that she is without 
sufficient means with which to pay her fees on appeal. 
Respondent has the option of reducing the rental property awarded 
to her to cash, if she so chooses, or of mortgaging either home 
awarded to her. Instead, she requests that appellant pay her 
fees on appeal. The unfairness of her approach is demonstrated 
in the final paragraph on page 40 of her brief. Respondent asks 
this court that she not be required to expend her assets to pay 
her attorney, and that the court require appellant to come up 
with the funds, but does not refer this court to a source from 
which appellant can draw to pay her obligation. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court must reappraise the decision of the trial court 
in this case because the allocation of the parties' financial and 
material possessions is so discordant that appellant is unable to 
pursue his separate life. Appellant' s appeal to this court for 
relief from the trial' s court erroneous decision should not 
result in sanctions against him or in an award of permanent 
alimony in favor of the respondent on an issue which has not been 
brought properly before this court. 
DATED this )$fr day of February, 1990. 
7^7. Or,-, A,,J~J 
DAVID /&. SSOLOWIT Z/ 
M. JOY DOUGLAS 
Attorneys for appellant 
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